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Introduction
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation."r The Takings
Clause is the most impor-tant protection of property rights in the Constitution and is a substantial
lirnit on federal powe..' The Takings Clause is an implied assertion that upon just compensation,
private property may be taken by the federal government.3
The Takings Clause, commonly referred to as eminent domain, is one of the earliest Bill of
Rights absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 1aw".4 Through the 14th
Amendment, the Takings Clause has been applied to the states and thus, both the federal and states
govemments have the power to take private property when it is necessary for public use.s States
possess the power of eminent domain as a traditional police power.u In Kelo v. City of'New London,
in dicta, the Supreme Court stated, "we emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing fuither restrictions on it's exercise of the takings power."7 Thus, an eminent domain
dispute brought under a state constitutional provision may require a different analysis and may
lead to a different result then if it were brought under the federal constitutional Takings Clause.s
'U.S. Const. amend. V.
'E.wi., Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 668 (5th ed. 2015).
' Williu* Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power,l22YaleL.J.l7gl (2013).
a Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 609 (19'h ed. 2016).
t Id. at 667
6 Id.
7 Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 615 (2016).
8 I Nichols on Eminent Domain $ 1.3 (2018).
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For the purpose of this academic analysis. the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
Takings Clause will be the primary focus.
The Supreme Court has identified two types of takings.e A possessory taking is when the
government physically confiscates or occupies property.lo A regulatory taking is when the
government regulates a property so much so as to leave no reasonable or economically viable use
of the property.r I For the purpose of this academic analysis, possessory takings will be the primary
focus.
The Takings Clause guarantees that the government does not have the power to confiscate the
property of some in order to give to others.r2 The Takings Clause also bars "the federal from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all faimess and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."'' If the government confiscates one person's property to benefit society,
then society as a whole should pay for it.'a In this way, eminent domain weighs the delicate balance
between governmental power and the rights of the individual citizen.rs
il. The History of Eminent Domain
Hugo Grotius, a 17ft century natural-law jurist, theorized that the power of eminent domain
was based upon the known principle that the state has absolute ownership of the whole property
maintained by the individual and that the individual's current possession and enjoyment of the
' Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 669 (2015).
'o Id.t'Id.
" Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 668 (2015).
'3 Ann K. Wooster, What Constitutes Taking of Property Requiring Compensation Under
Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to Llnited States Constitution, l0 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231,2.
'o Er*in Chemerinsk!, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 668 (2015).
't Albe.to B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philosophies Post-
Kelo,4l Wake Forrest L. Rev. 237 (2006).
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property was derived from the grant of the state.r6 The individual was subject to an implied
reservation that the individual's rights to the property might be extinguished by a rightful exertion
of ultimate ownership by the state.rT Samuel von Pufendorf, Grotius' contemporary, called the
power of eminent domain, "the exercise of transcendental property whereby the sovereign resumed
possession pursuant to the tacit agreement implicit in the original grant that the properfy might be
resumed to meet the necessities of the sovereign."'t The power of eminent domain was known in
Great Britain by the time of the founding of the United States of America.le According to
Blackstone, Great Britain longtime viewed eminent domain as a natural consequence of the royal
birthright inherent in the concept of feudalism.'o Howeuer, the MagnaCarta expressed the need
for just compensation when the sovereign seized property.2r The Magna Carta,just as The United
States Constitution does, represents a restriction on the power of the sovereign and greatly
influenced the United States Bill of Rights.r2
Although eminent domain was known in Great Britain at the founding of the United States of
America, the Constitution, in its original form, did not mention the power of eminent domain
explicitly.23 During the time of the founding fathers, federal takings power was plainly denied. The
Supreme Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan held, "the United States have no constitutional
capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, except in the District
and territories." The federal government relied on the traditional state policing power when it
'u I Nicholr on Eminent Domain $ Ll3 (2018).t' Id.
18 Id.
re Baude, supra at 1745.
'o I Nichols on Eminent Domain $ 1.13 (2018).2r Michael R. Salvas, A Structural Approach to Judicial Takings,
(2013).
" Id.
23 Baude, supraat1745.
l6 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1398
needed land for federal projects. The federal govemment would either have the state take the land
and the state would transfer the land to the federal govemment or the federal govemment would
have federal agents proceed as plaintiffs under state condemnation law.2a
Upon the ratification of the 5'h Amendment of the Constitution, which states "private
property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation," a modem view that the
Constitution itself contained an implied recognition of eminent domain emerged.25 The
indisputable authority of the federal govemment to exercise the power of eminent domain was
clearly recognized and asserted by the Supreme Courtin Kohl v. (Jnited States.26In Kohlv. United
States, eminent domain was used to seize private property for the construction of a post office in
Cincinnati, Ohio.27 The Supreme Court held that the federal government had an implied power of
eminent domain, stating, "the power to establish post-offices and to create courts within the
states... included in it...authority to obtain sites for such offices and for court houses, and to obtain
them by such means as were known and appropriate."2s The court reasoned that although the power
of eminent domain was not enumerated in the constitution, the power was implied. The court also
held that the 5th Amendment intended to give the federal govemment an implied power of eminent
domain.2e The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the 56 Amendment was intended to restrain
the federal government's eminent domain power by requiring the government to pay just
compensation, that the federal government must have had the power of eminent domain in the first
place.to
2a Batde, supra at 17 6l .
25 Baude, supra at 1790.
'o I Nichols on Eminent Domain $ I .24 (2018).
" Kohl v. Llnited States, gl U.S. 367, 372 (187 5).
'8 Id.
'n Id.
30 Id. at373.
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Upon the Kohl v. United States decision in 1875, there was no question that the federal
government had the right to acquire private property, upon just compensation, regardless of
whether such property was located in the District of Columbia, the territories, or the states.3r
lil. The Modern Eminent Domain Framework
The modern analysis under the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the United States
Constitution can be divided into three questions: (1) Is there a taking?, (2) Is the taking for a public
use?, (3) Has just compensation been paid?
A. What Constitutes a Taking?
As previously discussed, there are two categories of takings the Supreme Court has identified.3z
A possessory taking is when the government physically confiscates or occupies property.s3 A
regulatory taking is when the government regulates a property so much so as to leave no reasonable
or economically viable use of the property.ra For the purpose of this academic analysis, possessory
takings will be the primary focus.
The Supreme Court has generally found a taking when the federal govemment confiscates or
physically occupies private property.3s In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, the
Supreme Court stated, "When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permeant physical
occupation of real property, this court has invariably found a taking."36
3r I Nichols on Eminent Domain $ 1.24 (2018).3' Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 669 (2015).
33 Id.
3o Id.
tt Id.
36 Loretto v. Manhatten CATV Corp.,458 U.S. 419,427 (1982).
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Government confiscation of private properfy has always been considered a classic taking.37 In
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckw'ith, the government confiscated the interest accruing
on an interpleader's bank account.3S The Supreme Court held this to be a classic taking because
the government expropriated the money in the account, which is private property.3e
The Court has also found a taking when the government physically occupies private property.ao
In United States v. Causby, the Supreme Court found a taking when the govefirment's use of
airspace for military drills destroyed the use of land which was used as a chicken farm.al The Court
stated, "the government's action was as complete as if the United States had entered upon the
surface of the land and take exclusive possession of it."az
A court will find a valid taking pursuant to the Takings Clause of the 5tr' Amendment of the
United States Constitution, when the federal govemment confiscates or physically occupies private
property.a3
B. What Constitutes a Public Use?
The 5tl' Amendment of the United States constitution authorizes a valid taking only if the
property has been taken for public use.'o If the taking is for private use, then the taking is invalid
and the government must return the property to the original private o*rr".."
3'Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 670 (2015).
'r Id.
3n Id.
40 Id.
4t Id.
o' Id.
43 Id. at 669.
44 Id. at 69l.
4s Id.
8
Towards determinations of public use, the Supreme Court has historically given deference
to the state legislafure.au In B"r-rn v. Parker, the Supreme Courl held there to be a proper public
use when a District of Columbia law authorizing the taking of private properS for the purpose of
redeveloping blighted areas was challenged.t' The court showed deference to the legislature by
stating, "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well nigh
conclusive and that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation."a8
Like other economic liberties granted in the constitution, the Supreme Court awards the
rational basis test.ae In Hawoii Hottsing v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court found a proper public use,
where the Hawaii Land Reform Act, which sought to break up large land holdings, was
challenged.so The Hawaiian legislature found thatT2private landowners owned 47Yo of the State's
land and the state and federal government owned 49oh leaving only 4Yo for other private owners,
which was responsible for inflated land prices.s' The Supreme Court held, "where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has
never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." s2
In 2005, through its Kelo v. Ciry" of New London decision, the Supreme Court expanded its
view of what constitutes a public use one step further.s3ln Kelo v. City qf New London,the state
approved a developmental plan that was intended to create jobs, increase tax revenue, and
a6 Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far; Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain
Reform?,2006 Mich. L. Rev. 709,716 (2006).
a7 Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 6l I (2016).
o' Ber*o, v. Parker,348 U.S. 26,32 (1954).
ae Sandefur, supra at717.
50 Kathleen M. sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 6l I (2016).t' Id.
52 Sarrdefu. , supra at 7l8-719.
s3 Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, constitutional Law 618 (2016).
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revitalize the economically distressed area of the Cify of New Londor.to In accordance with the
approved developmental plan, Pfizer Inc. announced it would build a $300 million research
facility.ss To build this facility, the state purchased property from willing buyers and used the
power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property needed.s6 Petitioner, Suzette
Kelo, who had owned a property in New London for over sixty years, challenged the project on
the grounds that it violated the Fublic Use Clause of the 5'h Amendment.sT The Supreme Court
held that because increased jobs and tax revenues can be rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, that the judiciary should give deference to the legislature, and that there was a valid
taking.ss
In Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, she makes clear that the decision in Kelo takes
the power of eminent domain too far by distinguishing Kelo from the decisions in Bennan and
Midkiff.se Justice O'Connor reasons that in Berman and Midkiff, the targeted properties inflicted
affirmative harm on society60 and in both instances the legislature found that eliminating the
existence of the properties was necessary in order to remedy the harm.6l Justice O'Connor
distinguishes these two cases with the facts in Kelo, where O'Connor argues that Suzette Kelo's
"well-maintained home" is not a source of any social harm."6l
to K"lo v. City of New London,545 U.S. 469,472,125 S. Ct.2655,2658 (2005).
ss Id.
s6 Id.
s' Kelo at266O.
sB Id. at2665.
se Id. at267l.
60ln B"r*arz, the affirmative harm was through blight that resulted in extreme poverty. In
Midkiff,the affirmative harm was through oligopoly which resulted from extreme wealth.
ut Id.
62 Id.
10
The 5'h Amendment of the United States constitution authorizes a valid taking only if the
property has been taken for public use. Towards detenninations of public use, the Supreme Court
has historically given deference to the state legislarure. And like other economic liberties granted
in the constitution, the Supreme Court awards the rational basis test.
C. What Constitutes Just Compensation?
The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution clearly authorizes the government to
seize property for a public purpose, so long as the private owner is justly compensated.63 The
requirement to pay just compensation provides an important constraint to the government's
overuse of the govefilment's eminent domain power.uo If not for the limitation of just
compensation, it would be far easier for the government to abuse their power of eminent domain.6s
The constitutional measure for just compensation is "fair market value".66 The Supreme
Court has defined "fair market value" as "what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller at the
time of the taking."67 However, the government is not responsible for paying for any increases in
value that occur solely because of its plan to seize the property.6s
The law of just compensation also fails to acknowledge the home as anything other than
an exchangeable commodiry.6e Sentimental value, which is valued by homeowners, has no bearing
on determining the fair market value and thus has no bearing on the just compensation received by
the homeowners.'o
u' John Fee, Eminent Domain and The Sanctity of Home,8l Notre Dame L. Rev. 783,789
(2006).
uo Id.
6s Id.
uu Id.
u' Id.
ut E.*in Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 693 (2015).
6e Fee, supra at789.
70 Id.
1l
Just compensation will be found valid if it represents the fair market value of the property
at the time of taking.
U. Reactions Post-Kelo
ln Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court stated, "we emphasize that nothing in our
opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power."7r This made clear to state legislatures that if they did not agree with the expansive view
of the Public Use Clause decided upon in Kelo,then they could make further restrictions in their
state's constitution." Publi. reaction to Kelo was swift and intense." Stut. legislatures in every
region of the United States of America amended their constitutions to make clear that "public use"
was not expansive enough to include private economic development projects.Ta Only one year after
Kelo was decided, more than half of the states enacted eminent domain reform legislation.T5
The common changes in eminent domain reform legislation include, (l) a narrower definition
of public use to prevent takings solely to increase tax revenues; (2) tightened definitions of blight
and in a few instances the elimination of the use of eminent domain to eradicate blight; (3)
enhanced public notice, hearing, and good-faith negotiations requirements prior to condemnation;
(4) a shift in burden to the condemning authority to demonstrate the public use and need for a
taking; (6) more generous payments for relocation of property owners; (7) additional compensation
for residential landowners above the fair market value level; and, (8) oppornrnities for landowners
7r Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 615 (2016).
" 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain Special Alert (2018).
73 Id.
'o Id.
" Id.
t2
to repurchase their properly should the condemnor not proceed with the planned project after a
specified amount of time.76
Following the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, state legislatures swiftly
amended their state constitutions to include stronger restraints on eminent domain.
V. Finnis'Theory of the Basic Good
In Natural Law and Natural Rights, John Finnis explains that there are seven basic human
goods, which include (l) life, (2) knowledge, (3) play, (4) aesthetic experience, (5) sociability
(friendship), (6) practical reasonableness, and (7) religion.TT Finnis describes how these seven
basic goods serve as an explanation of why we do things.78 He believes that any worthwhile
activity is only worth doing if it partakes in one or more of the seven basic goods.Te He further
explains that the basic goods are intrinsic goods, which are worth having for their own sake, and
are not meant as a means of obtaining other goods.8O The seven basic goods are exhaustive and all
are equally fundamental.*' By good, Finnis does not mean moral good.S2 Instead, Finnis believes
we need these seven goods in order to live a worthwhile and valuable life.S3
A. Life
76 Id.
" John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights 85-89 (Oxford University Press, Second Edition
2011).
78 Id. at85.
1e Id.
" Id.
* Id.
8' Id.
,, Id,
l3
Finnis describes the first basic value, life, as corresponding to the drive for self-
preservation.sa The term life signifies, "every aspect ofvitality which puts a human being in shape
for self-determination."85 Finnis realizes that the basic human good of life may vary.86 Life
includes "bodily health and freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury."
Finnis singles out the transmission of life by procrcation as an example ofthe basic good of life.87
Finnis explains why procreation falls under this category by stating, "We can distinguish the desire
and decision to have a child, simply for the sake ofbearing a child, from the desire and decision
to cherish and educate the child.8S The former desire and decision is a pursuant of the good of
life...are aspects of the pursuit of the distinct basic values of sociability and truth, running
alongside the continued purcuit of the value of like that is involved in simply keeping the child
alive and well until it can fend for itself."8e
As it pertains to Finnis' examplc ofprocreation, eminent domain does not apply. However,
it can be argued, that because the govemment can only take property if it is for a public benefit,
that eminent domain falls under the category of life. If the govemment is taking away property
from a private owner and is building on that property something that is for the health and well-
being of the community, such as a medical clinic, then this form of eminent domain would be
promoting the basic good of life. Therefore, depending on what for which the govemment takes
land, there is an argument that eminent domain promotes the basic good oflife.
B. Knowledqe
8a Id. at 86.lt5,,la-
86 Id.
* Id.
" Id.at87.
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Finnis contends that knowledge is an intrinsic good that is considered to be desirable for
its own sake and not simply as a means or instrument to obtain other goods.eo Finnis explains, "any
proposition, whatever its subject matter, can be inquired into in either ofthe two distinct ways, (i)
instrumentality or (ii) out of curiosity, the pure desire to know, to find out the truth about it simply
out of an interest in or concern for truth and a desire to avoid ignorance or error as such."el
Curiosity is the "desire or inclination or felt want that we have when,just for the sake ofknowing,
we want to find out about something."e' After reflecting upon this curiosity, Fimis finds that it
becomes clear that knowledge is a good thing to have, not merely for its utility.e3 Finnis contends
that ignorance and muddle are to be avoided.ea Finnis determines that the good of knowledge is
self-evident and obvious and therefore, formulates a real and intelligent reason for action.e5
It can be argucd that eminent domain does apply to the basic good ofknowledge. Eminent
domain takes public property for the benefit of the public. In situations where the govemment
takes property and uses that property to build a public library or a public school, it can be argued
that eminent domain, in that case, would be promoting the basic good of knowledge. Because
through the law of eminent domain, the government would be making it easier for the public to
access information.ln Kelo, the govemment used eminent domain to build a research center. This
research ceoter would promote knowledge. Thus, it can be argued that eminent domain promotes
the basic good of knowledge.
C. Plav
eo Id. at 62.
et Id. at 60.
e2 Id.
e3 Id. at 61.
es Id. at 64.
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Although Finnis acknowledges that a moralist analyzing human goods may overlook the
basic good of play, Finnis believes that it would be a mistake to overlook play as an intricate and
important element in human culfure.e6 Engaging in performances that have no point beyond the
performance itself is enjoyed for its own sake.eT Play can be varied.es Play can be solitary, social,
intellectual, physical, strenuous, relaxed, highly structured, relatively informal, or ad hoc.ee Play
can enter into any activity, so long as the play is distinguishable from the rest of the activity.rOo
Finnis concludes that play has, and is, its own value.r0r
It can be argued that the law of eminent domain can in some capacities promote the basic
good of play. If the government takes properfy in order to convert that property into a recreational
center that has activities like dance class, art class, and recreational sports, then eminent domain
can be said to promote the basic good of play. But, inversely, the government may be taking a
property where a child uses the backyard of their home to play with their family and friends. If the
govemment builds a public forum for activities to be enjoyed through play, then the law of eminent
domain can be argued to promote the good of play.
D. Aesthetic Experience
Aesthetic experience and play may intertwine.'02 Many forms of play, such as dance and
song, can be considered aesthetic experience as well as play. However, beauty is not an essential
of play, as it is for aesthetic experience.'03 Finnis states, "aesthetic experience, unlike play, need
eu Id. at 87 .
n' Id.
e8 Id.
ee Id.
loo Id.
lot Id.
,0, Id-
r03 Id.
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not involve an action of one's own; what is sought after and valued for its own sake may simply
be the beautiful form 'outside' one, and the'inner' experience of appreciation of its beauty.r0a But
often, the aesthetic experience is found in the creation or active apperception of some work of
significant and satisfing form." r05
It can be argued that eminent domain promotes the basic good of aesthetic experience. If
the government uses the taken land to build a public park, then it could be said to be promoting
the good of aesthetic experience. On the other hand, many find aesthetic pleasure in their own
home. Many find beauty in their own backyards watching the sun rise and fall. By taking their
homes away, the government may be taking away the homeowners personal aesthetic experience.
E. Sociability(Friendship)
Finnis explains that there is a range of the good of sociability which "in its weakest form
is realized by a minimum of peace and harmony amongst persons, and which ranges through the
forms of human community to is strongest form in the flowering of a full friendship."tou Friendship
involves actingfor the sake of your friend's well-being,l07 whereas a mere collaboration between
rwo individuals is no more than instrumental to the realization to their own individual purposes.r08
To be in true friendship with at least one other person is a basic and fundamental good.rOe
The basic good of sociability can be argued applicable to eminent domain. When the
government uses the power of eminent domain, they do so to build a public benefit, such as a post
office or a retail development. These public benefits create communities and meeting places for
to4 Id.
ros 1d. at 88.
106 Id.
to7 Id.
to, Id.
toe Id.
t7
neighbors to connect and to be social. For example, in Kelo, the City of New London used eminent
domain in order to have the land necessary to build a large gathering center. This center was meant
to be enjoyed by the entire community and would promote the basic good of friendship. For this
reason eminent domain can be argued to promote the basic good of sociability.
F. Practical Reasonableness
Finnis defines practical reasonableness as "the basic good of being able to bring one's own
intelligence to bear effectively on the problems of choosing one's actions and life-style and
shaping one's own character."ll0 He explains that negatively, this is someone who has a measure
of effective freedom and that positively, this is someone who seeks to bring an intelligent and
reasonable order into one's owns actions and habits and practical attihrdes.llr Practical
reasonableness has an internal and external aspect.l'' The internal aspect is when one "strives to
bring one's emotions and dispositions into the harmony of an inner peace of mind that is not merely
the product of drugs or indoctrination nor merely passive in its orientation.r '3 The external aspect
is when one "strives to make one's actions authentic, that is to say, genuine realizations of one's
own freely ordered evaluations, preferences, hopes, and self-determination."lla Finnis concedes
that this value is complex. Practical reasonableness encompasses the unity betrveen freedom,
reason, integrity and authenticity.r15 He identifies nine (9) basic requirements of practical
reasonableness: (1) a coherent plan of life, (2) no arbitrary preferences amongst values, (3) no
arbitrary preferences amongst persons, (4) detachment, (5) commitment, (6) the (limited)
tto Id.
,r, Id.
ttz Id.
tr3 Id.
,ro Id.
,rt Id.
l8
relevance of consequences: efficiency, within reason, (7) respect for every basic value in every
act, (8) the requirements of the common good, and (9) following one's conscience.rro
I will discuss practical reasonableness as related to eminent domain in a later part of this
essay.
G. Relieion
Finnis accepts that many may doubt or deny that one of the basic human values is the
establishment and maintenance of the proper relationship between oneself and the divine.llT
However, Finnis explains that, "there is the order of means to ends, and the pursuit of life, truth,
play, and aesthetic experience in some individually selected order of priorities and pattern in
specialization, and the order that can be brought into human relations through collaboration,
community, and friendship, and the order that is to be brought into one's character and activity
through inner integrity and outer authenticity..."rrs Based on this order of means to ends and the
pursuit of life, truth, play and aesthetic experience, Finnis possess two questions: (1) "How are all
these orders, which have their immediate origin in human initiative and pass away in death, related
to the lasting order of the whole cosmos and to the origin, if any, of that order?", (2) "Is it not
perhaps the case that human freedom, in which one rises above the determination of instinct and
impulse to an intelligent grasp of worthwhile forms of good, and through which one shapes and
masters one's environment but also one's own character, is itself somehow subordinate to
something which makes that human freedom, human intelligence, and human mastery possible no
116 ld.at loo-125.
"' Id. at}g.
1r8 Id.
l9
human being can be?"lle Finnis intimates that regardless ofinclination to doubt or deny, we should
be establishing and maintain a relationship with the divine.
The basic good ofreligion is inapplicable to this analysis because the law of eminent domain
does not involve Finnis' concept of religion. This does not have a negative impact on whether
eminent domain is viewed as "moral", because Finnis believes not every moral act involves all
seven goods.
W. Practical Reasonableness and Morality
Finnis contends that each ofthe seven basic forms ofhuman good "can be participated in, and
promoted, in an inexhaustible variety ofways and with an inexhaustible variety of combinations
of emphasis, concentration, and specialization."l20 Fimis explains that practical reasonableness is
participated in by shaping one's participation with other basic goods.''' Practical reasonableness
guides our commitments, our selection of projects and what we do in carrying them out.r22 Only
one who has experience (both ofhuman wants and passions and ofthe conditions ofhuman life)
and intelligence and a desire for reasonableness stronger than the desires that might overwhelm it,
may tell that a decision is practically reasonable.l23 Finnis explains that practical reasonableness
is "both a basic aspect ofhuman well-being and concerns one's participation in all the other aspects
of human well-being."r2a The basic forms of good are oppornrnities of well-being. Meaning, the
more fully one participates in them, the more one is what one can be.l2s Finnis illustrates nine basic
|9 rr
"' Id. at loo.
121 Id.
,r, Id.
123 Id. at 102.
t'4 Id.
)2s Id.
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requirements of practical reasonableness: ( I ) a coherent plan of life, (2) no arbitrary preferences
amongst values, (3) no arbitrary preferences amongst persons, (4) detachment, (5) commitment,
(6) the (limited) relevance ofconsequences: efficiency, within reason, (7) respect for every basic
value in every act, (8) the requirements of the common good, and (9) following one's
conscience.l26 All of the requirements are interrelated and can be regarded as aspccts of one
another.l2T
A. A Coherent Plan of Life
Finnis defines a coherent plan of life as "a harmonious set of purposes and orientations,
not as the 'plans' or 'blueprints' of a pipe-dream, but as effective commitments."l2s However, he
distinguishes that although it is unreasonable to live moment to moment, following immediate
cravings, it is also irrational to devote a[[ of one's attention to specific projccts.l2e A coherent plan
of life requires "both direction and control of impulses, and the undertaking of specific projects;
but they also require the redirection of inclinations, the reformation ofhabits, the abandonment of
old and adoption of new projects...and, overall, the harmonization of all one's deep
commitments."l30 Finnis reasons that basic aspects of human goods are not definite objectives of
projects; instead they are participated in. Finnis regards this first requirement as significant.l3l
The takings clause can arguably promote a coherent plan oflife, not for thc individual, but
for the United States as a whole. Eminent domain is enacted to bring services for the greater good
that are to be used for public use. The citizens ofthe United States trust that their govemment is
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going to give them services such as museums and schools which help individuals to have a
coherent plan oflife. On the other hand, the individual citizen, who is having their property taken
by eminent domain may not have that invasion oftheir privacy part oftheir coherent plan oflife.
And thus, eminent domain does not promote a coherent plan of life for that individual citizen.
B. No Arbitrary Preferenccs Amonqst Values
Finnis believes that any commitment to a coherent plan of life must not leave out, or
arbitrarily discount, any of the basic human values for the exaggeration of another basic human
value.l32 Finnis concedes that "any commitment to a coherent plan oflife is going to involve some
degree ofconcentration on one or some of the basic forms ofgood, at the expense, temporarily or
permanently, of other forms of good."l33 However, the commitment will only be rational if, "it is
on the basis of one's assessment of one's capacities, circumstances and one's tastes" and would
be irrational if, "it is on the basis of a devaluation of any of the basic forms of human
excellence... "l3a In essence, Finnis believes that one can prioritize certain goods or others in
pursuit ofa coherent life, however one must not prioritize those goods for arbitrary reasons.
Private property is not an absolute good. Therefore, ifthe power of eminent domain is used
to further a good, even exclusively, such as esthetic experience, it isjust. It is not arbitrary. There
is a good reason to further a good over a non-good such as thc right to private prope(y. For this
reason, eminent domain promotes this value.
C. No Arbitrary Preferences Amonpst Persons
132 Id.
,r. Id.
,ro Id.
22
Finnis explains that to have no arbitrary preference amongst persons is a human good and
this good can be pursued, realized, and participated in by any human being.t3sThis third
requirement makes known the fundamental impartiality among the human subjects who may be
partakers of the basic goods.l36 Finnis explains that although another person's involvement and
enjoyment of the basic good does not interest, concern, or affect us, we still have no reason to deny
others partaking in those goods.''7 This third requirement is "a pungent critique of selfishness,
special pleading, double standards, hypocrisy, indifference to the good of others whom one could
easily help, and all other manifold forms of egoistic and group bias."r38 Finnis cites the Golden
Rule as an example of this requirement.l3e The Golden Rule states, "Do to or for others what you
would have them do you or for you."loO Finnis explains that "one's moral judgments and
preferences b e universalizable."
The takings clause does promote this requirement of practical reasonableness. For example,
in Kelo, the dispute was between a cooperation, Pfizer, and a private citizen, Suzette Kelo. Some
may argue that by taking Suzette Kelo's land, the corporation was being arbitrary towards one
person. However, that is not the case. The corporation was building in order to achieve the common
good for the individuals ofNew London. This was for a good reason and was not arbitrary, because
as was previously stated, Suzette Kelo's right to private property is not a good.
D. Detachment
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Finnis believes that "in order to be sufficiently open to all the basic forms ofgood in all
the changing circumstances ofa lifetime, and in all one's relations, often unforeseeable, with other
persons, an in all one's opportunities ofeffecting their well-being or relieving hardship, one must
have a certain detachment from all the specific and limited project which one undertakes."'o'
Meaning, one must not take up an attitudc ifone's project fails.la2 Ifa project does fail, one must
not feel life is drained of meaning. Finnis believes that, "such an attitude irrationally devalues and
treats as meaningless the basic human good ofauthentic and reasonable self-determination, a good
in which one meaningfully participates simply by trying to do something sensible and worthwhile,
whether or not that sensible and worthwhile project comes to nothing."ra3
Finnis believes that if an individual becomes too attached, that is if the individual become
fanatical in his or her pursuits, it goes against this basic valuc. Depending on how fanatical the
corporation or municipality is in pursuing eminent domain will determine whether eminent domain
supports this basic value. For example, in Kelo, it is clear that Pfizer and the City of New London
were not fanatical in theirpursuits. Pfizer and the City of New London were not so focused on this
project that if it did not succeed they would not find meaning in their life. This is further evidenced
by the fact that the Pfizer development never actually came to fruition. It is apparent that because
the city and Pfizer were not fanatical in their commitment to build the proposed development that
they were detached enough to support this basic value.
E. Commitment
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Commitment, Finnis explains, is the requirement that one's general commitments should
not be abandoned arbitrarily.laa Someone who follows the requirement of commitment, should be
looking for new and better ways of realizing one's commitments and should not restrict one's
project by sticking with efforts, methods, and routines which are familiar.ras Finnis explains that,
"such creativity and development shows that a person, or a society, is really living on the level of
. , ..146pracucal pnnclple.
Eminent domain supports the basic value of commitment. For the individual actor, they
make commitments that have to do with their land and based on those commitments they make
choices and plans. When their private property is taken for eminent domain the value of
commitment is still supported because they are not giving their property for arbitrary reasons.
Public actors, such as govemment and corporations, take property through eminent domain in
order to give the public basic goods, which means the reason for the taking is not arbitrary. They
make a commitment to give to the public. In this way, the basic value of commitment is supported.
Anything that the govemment or corporations do to promote the common good shows
commitment.
F. The Relevance ofConsequences: Efficiencv. Within Reason
The sixth requirement, Finnis believes, goes to the heart of morality.raT This requirement
compels one to bring about good in the world by actions that are effcient for their reasonable
purpose.'o* Finnis believes it is wrong to waste opponunities by using inefficient methods.rae
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"One's actions should be judged by their effectiveness, by their fitness for their purpose, by their
utility and their consequences."''o For example, it is reasonable to prefer human goods to
instrumental goods.l5' Finnis believes that the choices we make, as well as the reasoning behind
those choices, is significant.ls2
The takings clause promotes this requirement if the taking is the most efficient way in order
to bring about the public use. If there is another, more efficient, way to give a particular public
benefit to the community, then the takings clause does not promote this requirement. If the
govemment uses eminent domain where it is needed, then it supports this basic value. For example,
in Kelo,The City of New London used eminent domain to create jobs and economic wealth for
the town. The town used eminent domain because they needed to economically revitalize the town,
therefore, in this example, the sixth requirement was realized.
G. Respect for Everv Basic Value in Every Act
Finnis introduces the seventh basic requirement by stating that it may be formulated in
I51 
-.many ways.'" Finnis describes the first formulation as, "one should not choose to do any act which
of itself does nothing but damage or impede a realization or participation of any one or more of
the basic forms ofhuman good."r54 Finnis denounces the consequentialist "weighing" ofgoods.l5s
Finnis believes, "if consequentialist reasoning were reasonable, acts which themselves do nothing
but damage or impede a human good could often be justified as parts of, or steps on the way to
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carrying out, some project for the promotion of some forms ofgood."r56 Essentially, Finnis asserts
that "reason requires that every basic value be at least respected in each and every action."l57
Finnis describes that all ofthe seven basic goods must be valued and respected. Eminent
domain respects this basic value in a very simple sense: the right to private property is not a basic
value or good. Therefore, the taking ofprivate property does not go against this value.
H. Requirements of the Common Good
Finnis describes the common good as, "the factor or set offactors which, as considerations
in someone's practical reasoning, would make sense of or give reason for that individual's
collaboration with others and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for their
collaboration with each other and with that individual."r58 There is common good for human being
so long as the basic human goods (life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion,
and freedom in practical reasonableness) are good for any and every person.'5' Finnis explains,
"each ofthese human values is itselfa 'common good' inasmuch as it can be participated in by an
inexhaustible number ofperson in an inexhaustible variety ofways or in an inexhaustible variety
of occasions."l60
This basic requirement is extremely applicable to eminent domain. Private property can
only be taken through the power of eminent domain if it is being taken to further a public use.
Typically, this public use includes developments such as schools or post offices. In Kelo, the court
found that the town was furthering an economic public benefit by erecting a complex that would
create morejobs and would increase tax revenue. Eminent domain is used for the common good
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so that individuals can experience the seven basic goods. Eminent domain clearly promotes this
basic value.
I. Following One's Conscience
The ninth requirement, Finnis explains, is a sumrnary ofall the previous requirements, yet
it is also distinct in its own right.16l This requirement is that one must act in accordance with one's
own conscience.l62
When discussing this basic requirement, one must ask if a person with an informed
conscious would make the decision to use the power of eminent domain to take someone's private
properfy. A person who has an informed conscious understands how their decisions interact and
intersect with the seven basic goods and the nine principles of practicable reasonableness. An
informed conscious shows practical judgment. As previously discussed, eminent domain is enacted
for the common good. It is used to build public benefits. Therefore, because it is used for the
common good, it is clear that a person with an informed conscious would support the decision to
use the power of eminent domain.
WL Conclusion
Finnis would find the doctrine of eminent domain morally just because it promotes many of
the basic goods and follows all the requirements of practical reasonableness. Even though the
doctrine of eminent domain does not promote all of the basic goods, Finnis does not require that
for the law to be morally just. Therefore, according to the Finnis' teachings, eminent domain is
morally just.
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